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Abstract 
Value-at-risk is an instrument which is widely used by financial institutions for calculating 
risk. It has been known since the late nineties that this tool lacks an important logical 
property: subadditivity. This can cause major errors, leading to systematic underestimation of 
risk when multiple portfolios are combined. It is known to be caused by coarseness in the 
return distribution and is thus most problematic when using historical simulation. 
This thesis investigates the severity of subadditivity violations from historical simulation, 
using the oil markets as a source of data. In order to measure this, a variant of the standard 
backtest has been used. The amount of subadditivity is found to be strongly dependent on the 
correlation between the individual portfolios, but independent of the choice of confidence 
level and sample size. A negative correlation virtually eliminates non-subadditivity altogether.  
 
Keywords: Value-at-risk, subadditivity, historical simulation, backtesting, oil futures. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Backgound 
The task of correctly quantifying financial risk has been an increasingly important issue for 
organizations. A wide array of risk measures exist and are being used in various industries, 
from simple calculations of expected losses and volatility to extremely intricate models that 
uses numerous parameters. The most widely used risk measure today, and the one preferred 
by Statoil, is called value-at-risk (usually abbreviated VaR).  
While the quantile concept behind VaR is itself quite old, it was not until after the stock 
market crash of 1987 that it gained widespread use in finance. In the first years after that, it 
was mainly used in the derivatives market, but after the financial bank J.P. Morgan in 1994 
freely released their methodology in the RiskMetrics Technical Document, it very quickly 
became the standard risk measure for companies and regulators alike. In fact, after the Basel 
II accord was implemented with its Amendment to incorporate market risk, the use of VaR 
has become the main tool for determining capital charges against market risk.  
One of the main issues with VaR as a risk measure is that it is not subadditive (Artzner, 
1999). When splitting up a portfolio into smaller parts, it can sometimes be seen that the sum 
of the risks for the smaller parts does not add up to the risk for the combined portfolio. This 
undermines the whole fundamental principle of modern portfolio theory that states that 
combining portfolios should by itself not create extra risk (Markowitz, 1959). This may create 
a number of unhealthy effects, the most obvious of these being an underestimation of the 
actual risk suffered when using simple estimation tools (Daníelsson, 2010). A secondary 
effect is that incentives may be distorted and lead traders to engage in risky trade, while the 
senior management believes that risk is reduced (Garcia, 2005). 
This thesis will investigate the use of VaR in the oil market. The oil markets are of great 
importance in the global trade in that it still is the major source of energy in the world. In fact, 
the general consumption of oil, both by individuals and industries, are rising on a daily basis, 
even when new reserves are becoming increasingly costly to produce (Žiković, 2010). Also, 
the oil markets have become an important area for speculators. The price of oil often exhibits 
negative correlation with that of stocks, and therefore has a tendency of moving in the 
opposite direction of stocks. Because of this, oil futures have become a favored investment 
object for hedge funds (Hall, 2011). 
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1.2 Statoil and value-at-risk 
Statoil ASA is one of the major oil and gas companies in the world. On average, its total daily 
trade exceeds 2 million barrels of crude oil and condensate.  The products traded ranges from 
its core areas, oil and gas products, to methanol and lately even emission allowance contracts. 
Financial instruments used for this purpose includes futures, forwards and swaps, as well as 
standard cash trades. Options trading is only used to a lesser degree, and will not be examined 
in this paper. 
The oil trading at Statoil serves the purpose of optimizing the profit from running its refineries 
at Mongstad and Kalundborg. Here, the crude oil and condensate is processed into 
commercial fuel products like petrol, aviation fuel, jet fuel, diesel, heating oil and heavy 
bunker oil. Other products created in the refining process could be solvents, lubricants, 
bitumen, wax and asphalt. Statoil supplies these refineries from a global crude oil market, 
while the refined products on the other hand are mainly sold on the European market. 
The trading process at Statoil is rather decentralized, where the individual traders have a 
substantial amount of freedom in deciding which products to trade in and which trading tools 
to use in order to minimize the risk. The risk analysis desk sets risk limitations for the various 
traders, and the traders in term have to act inside these limitations. Since the late nineties, 
value-at-risk has been the preferred way of quantifying target risk. This way of organizing the 
trade is often called the rent-a-trader system and has the advantage of exploiting the expert 
knowledge of the individual traders to its fullest, while not letting them get bogged down in a 
complicated bureaucracy. 
The method of actually calculating value-at-risk is constantly under debate. In the beginning, 
the delta-normal parametric approach was used, but as it often failed to account for extreme 
outliers, it has been replaced by historical simulation. More advanced methods like weighting 
schemes and Monte Carlo simulation have been tested, but have proved to be somewhat 
unwieldy and often less effective than one would expect. 
 
1.3 Text outline 
This first chapter has created a general overview to value-at-risk as a risk measure, its use in 
Statoil and introduced the issue of the lack of subadditivity. 
The next chapter will focus on the general characteristics of oil trading, presenting the various 
financial instruments used in that regard. A discussion of the underlying mechanisms that 
drives the oil prices is also included. The principle of risk is presented and related specifically 
to the oil markets. 
Chapter 3 gives a theoretical background to how value-at-risk tries to capture the risk and 
quantify it. The diversification principle is presented, first as a general idea in modern 
portfolio theory and then through the notion of subadditivity. VaR as a risk measure is 
consequently shown to lack subadditivity in certain cases. The later sections then discuss tail 
behavior, giving some attempts to quantify and model the tail distribution. 
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Chapter 4 gives an overview of the methodology used in historical simulation. Comparisons 
between that and other methods are included, along with a discussion of certain variables. 
Lastly, this section presents backtesting as a way of evaluating the performance of the 
simulation in the past. 
Chapter 5 presents the data from the real products and attempts are made to create portfolios 
that generates interesting results. Two tests are performed to check how common 
subadditivity violations are. These are the single-day test, which checks at what confidence 
levels the portfolios are non-subadditive, and the backtest, which tracks the development of 
subadditivity violations over time.  
Some concluding remarks, a bibliography and a collection of figures not shown in the text 
itself constitutes the last three chapters of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Sources of information 
Quite a lot has been written about value-at-risk the last fifteen years. In fact, entire books have 
been devoted to the subject. I drew most of the background information from three books: 
Jorion (2001), Dowd (1998) and Alexander (2008). The latter of these was probably the most 
useful, as it contained more recent models and was generally more thorough. There are newer 
editions available from both of the other two authors, but I was unfortunately unable to 
acquire those. 
Some good information on how the oil market functions was collected from Scofield (2007) 
and Edwards (2010). Useful was also the more general approach by Hull (2006) in explaining 
the different financial tools used for trading. The most useful scientific papers discussing the 
issue of non-subadditivity would be Artzner et al. (1999), Daníelsson et al. (2010) and 
Žiković & Aktan (2010). Many of the ideas on how to structure this thesis were drawn from 
Dahl (2008). A full list of references is found at the end of this paper. 
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2 Petroleum trade and risk 
 
This chapter will give a general overview of the oil markets and risks associated with the 
trading of oil derivatives. Chapter 2.1 gives a rough outline of the different types of risk. 
Chapter 2.2 presents an overview of how the markets for oil products function, highlighting 
different products and different trader roles. Chapter 2.3 explains the various types of 
financial contracts like futures, forwards and swaps, and how the oil traders use them in order 
to minimize their risk. Chapter 2.4 details the underlying mechanism behind the fluctuations 
in the oil prices and explains the fundamental difference between short and long term 
development.  
 
2.1 What is risk? 
Risk is a term that is widely used within many areas. It is difficult to pin down a precise 
definition of what risk is, but it is commonly related to uncertainty, danger or randomness. 
Risk could be said to be the possibility of suffering an undesirable outcome. But it is a rather 
vague term, and it may mean a number of different things to different people, so reducing it to 
a single number will always mean losing a substantial amount of information. Still, the human 
mind struggles when it is told to make good decisions if a lot of factors need to be taken into 
consideration, and to managers of companies these simplifications have been invaluable. 
From a financial viewpoint, the undesirable outcomes are almost always in the form of 
monetary losses. The Basel committee recognizes that financial risk should be divided into 
three main areas: 
- Market risks are related to changes in market prices. The value of a firm‟s 
financial position changes continuously due to changes in value of its underlying 
components. The changes in the underlying components could be caused by 
changes in exchange rates between two currencies (often known as currency risk), 
changes in interest rate for lending money, changes in stock and bond prices 
(equity risk), or the changes in the price on specific goods (commodity risk) 
 
- Credit risks are related to the possibility a trading partner not being able to fulfill 
his end of a contract and monetary losses caused by this. The most common 
example of this would be when a borrower is unable to pay back a debt he owes 
and defaults on it. 
 
- Operational risks are related to monetary losses caused by failures or inadequacies 
in internal processes, people or systems, and losses caused by unforeseen external 
events. This is a broad umbrella category that would contain most of the risks not 
falling into the other two categories. 
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This paper is mainly concerned with the trade of petroleum products, which means that the 
market risk category, and more specifically the commodity risk category, is what applies the 
most. Even so, value-at-risk is a risk measure that is widely used for calculations of other 
types of risk as well. The results arrived at here could prove relevant both for other kinds of 
market risk and even in the fields of credit risk and operational risk. 
 
2.2 Overview of oil markets 
The trading of oil is dominated by the relationship between supplier and consumer countries. 
The major consumers are Europe, North-America and the industrializing countries of East 
Asia, while the major suppliers are generally less developed countries in the Middle East and 
South America. Norway is in a special position in that it is an industrialized country and at the 
same time a major exporter of oil.  
Due to the historical instability of many of the major oil supplying countries, most of the oil 
refineries are located in the consumer countries rather than near to where it is produced. There 
is therefore a global trading of unrefined oil, commonly known as crude oil. Crude oil is 
transported long distances, generally by tankers, and bought by the refiners in the consumer 
countries. More refined oil products play a smaller role in the global trade and are usually 
traded locally. As a result, there exists a global market for crude oil, which is determined 
mostly by the global supply and demand, whereas the more refined products are more prone 
to local variations of supply and demand. 
A variety of commercial products are created in the refinement process. Often they are 
divided into four categories: 
1. Light distillates: Gasoline for automobiles and aeroplanes;  
2. Middle distillates: Gas and diesel oils, jet and heating kerosenes 
3. Heavy distillates: Marine bunker oil; crude oil used directly as fuel 
4: Others: Naphtha; liquefied petroleum gas (LPG); solvents; petroleum coke; bitumen wax; 
lubricants. 
As can be seen from Table 2.1, the demand for commercial oil products comes mainly from 
three regions: USA/Canada, Europe and Southeast Asia. The first dominates the markets for 
light distillates, while Southeast Asia does so for heavy distillates. What affects the particular 
demand in these regions is consequently what affects the global demand as a whole. 
Crude oil comes in many varieties. Two common parameters to describe the quality of the 
crude are density and sulfur content. Lighter crudes have a higher proportion of simple 
hydrocarbons, and are more easily converted into commercial petroleum products like car 
fuel. Heavier crudes require in comparison more processing, and because of the higher 
viscosity they are also more taxing on processing equipment. Sulfur is an undesirable 
pollutant in crude oil, and requires the crude to undergo expensive cleansing. Crude oil with 
high or low sulfur content is known as sour and sweet crudes, respectively. The two 
commonly used benchmarks are Brent contracts which are used in the North Sea, and WTI 
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contracts for oil produced in the USA. Other types of crude produced in these regions are 
described relative to these standards.  
Edwards (2010) identifies the players engaged in the oil trade to fall into four groups: 
producers, consumers, refiners and marginal traders. The interaction between these 
participants is what drives the pricing mechanism of oil products, along with outside factors. 
The roles these participants play are in short:   
- Producers: Get the crude oil up to the surface and sell it for profit that exceeds the operating 
costs. 
- Consumers: Buy commercial petroleum products. This could be everything from a 
manufacturer to a private individual. 
- Refiners: Buy and transport crude oil to refineries, where they convert it to commercial 
products. These are then sold for profit. 
- Marginal traders: Buy processed or unprocessed products and try to resell the products at 
higher prices without altering the products themselves. 
Because of the advantages of economies of scale, many of the large oil companies are 
involved in more than one role. Statoil is mainly known as an operator on offshore 
installations, and thus a producer, but is also engaged in refining, marginal trade, and even 
some consumption as well.  
The production of oil has risen in a fairly linearly the since 1980, but many of the individual 
fields have reached its peak production years ago and is now declining, including most fields 
in the North Sea. The North Sea as a whole reached its peak in 1999. 
 
 Light Middle Heavy Others 
USA and Canada 10 970 7 188 1 390 5 326 
Latin America 1 227 1 872 704 973 
Europe 3 758 7 572 1 882 3 203 
Middle East 1 210 1 816 1 473 1 240 
Fmr. Soviet Union 923 1 146 699 1 168 
Africa 631 1 180 477 475 
Southeast Asia 6 600 8 810 3 526 5 021 
Table 2.1:  The daily consumption of refined oil products by geographical region in 2005 (in 
thousands bbl). Source: Schofield (2007) 
 
2.3 Financial contracts 
Traders in the oil markets use similar instruments for deals as other commodity traders. The 
four most common types of trading contracts are cash trades, futures, forwards and swaps. 
Cash trades involve an exchange of physical crude oil for cash in the spot market. Futures and 
forwards are negotiated contracts to buy a certain amount of crude at a certain price some set 
time in the future. While futures are contracts that are bought and sold on an exchange, like 
the Oslo Stock Exchange, forwards are traded in an over-the-counter (OTC) marketplace. 
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Forwards are agreements directly between two parties, and they can often be quite 
customized. Any revision of the terms of the contract is often a complicated affair that might 
involve professional lawyers.  
Futures, in comparison, are always standardized contracts made between one party and the 
exchange itself. Thus, the future contracts may themselves be traded freely in the market. To 
allow this liquidity the exchange requires the traders to deposit a margin to ensure the trader 
fulfills his obligations. This margin is typically between 5% and 10% of the value of the 
contract itself, and should be able to cover any changes in price over a one day period. Swaps 
are agreements to exchange cash flows in the future, the sizes of which are based on different 
price indices. Swaps are usually used to hedge against the price of a commodity. 
The portfolio of a crude oil trader at a given time is called the trader‟s position in the market. 
Positions can be described as either long or short. If a trader takes a long position, he benefits 
from an increased price. The long position most typically means that the trader has ownership 
of an asset, like some given amount of oil. If a trader takes a short position, he benefit from a 
decline in price. This usually means the trader owes another party an obligation for an already 
set price. An example would be being obligated to deliver of some amount of oil to a refinery.  
Because a party incurs considerable credit risk by entering into the trade of forwards and 
futures, measures are often done to reduce risk exposure. This is done through hedging. 
Hedging means taking a position that is opposite to an already existing position, thus negating 
it. For example, if a trader has entered a forward contract, agreeing to supply a refinery with a 
given amount of crude oil for a fixed price in the future, the trader faces large risks if the price 
of this crude rises. Also, this is not a very flexible position, and it may be difficult and costly 
to get out of. If the trader at the same time takes a long position in the futures market on a 
similar crude oil, the risk of price increase is virtually eliminated if the oil prices are 
correlated. 
The prices of derivatives like forwards and futures can be described relatively to the spot 
price. If the market believes the price of oil will rise in the future, the price of the oil future 
will be larger than the current spot price. Similarly, if the market estimates the price to fall in 
the future, the future price will be smaller than the spot price. In the commodity market this is 
known as contango and backwardation, respectively. Figure 2.1 displays how the market can 
change from contango to backwardation. 
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Figure 2.1: The future prices of Brent crude oil traded on two different dates. The length of the future 
contract is measured in days (d), weeks (w) and months (m) 
 
2.4 Price drivers 
The price of oil follows a highly irregular pattern, and fluctuates up and down over time. Not 
only does the price itself change, but the volatility of the price is also varying with time. This 
property is known as heteroskedasticity. The price can be relatively stable for long periods of 
time, only to be followed by violent changes that send ripples across the world. Classical 
economics explains this behavior through changes in supply and demand.  
In the short-term demand and supply are quite inelastic. Whatever gasoline may cost at a 
certain time, cars cannot just switch to another fuel.  Likewise, the fuel of ships, aeroplanes or 
factories cannot be easily changed in the short run. The supply of oil is also inelastic as the 
task of producing marginal amounts of oil is relatively inexpensive compared to the large 
initial investments made in drilling and assembling or transporting the platforms. Operating 
platforms is more or less the same whether it is producing at high or low percentages of full 
capacity. Thus, oil is pumped up roughly at a constant rate no matter the circumstances. 
Figure 2.2a shows how both the demand and supply curves must be steep, so that large 
changes in price only have a little impact on the quantities demanded or supplied. 
Fundamental changes in the short-term are often known as shocks and will cause the curves 
themselves to move one way or the other. Figure 2.2b shows how a sudden reduction in the 
supply of oil causes a big increase in the oil price. Such a shock might be caused by 
something unexpected like a loss of output from rig closures or disruption of supply routes 
due to wars or natural catastrophes. Figure 2.2c shows how a sudden increase in demand 
shifts the curve to the right and causes the price to be increased substantially. Wars or natural 
catastrophes could be candidates for this as well, doubling the effect it would have on price. 
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
Fu
tu
re
s 
p
ri
ce
 (
U
SD
/b
b
l)
 
Future length 
01.03.2011
01.10.2008
Date 
13 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 saw a major shock to demand, causing its curve to shift to the left. 
Consequently, the prices dropped from about 140 to 40 USD in just 6 months. 
Even if they are inelastic in the short-term, the long-term supply and demand are very elastic. 
The demand for oil can often be seen to move in a cyclical pattern. Oil is an essential input in 
many industries. Thus, when the activity in the economy as a whole increases, it will make the 
demand for oil increase, and when it decreases, the demand for oil will also fall. A major 
source of increased demand is the growth of the economies of the newly industrialized 
counties (NICs), like China, India, Brazil and Turkey. An enormous increase in oil 
consumption in these countries has fueled the markets with extra demand. 
The oil price is also dependent on the prices of substitute commodities. If there are cheaper 
alternatives available, the demand for oil will decrease. The most common substitutes for 
petroleum are most directly other non-renewable energy commodities like gas and coal, and 
more indirectly renewable energy commodities like solar and wind power or bio-fuel.  
Governments may also influence the demand for oil through taxation or regulation. High 
taxes or extra regulation will cause the prices to increase and thus decrease the quantity 
demanded. Governments will create incentives with their taxation policies, as it could impose 
taxes on oil products while holding it low for substitutes like renewables. 
Oil is a major source of heating, so demand will depend on climate. Most of the consumption 
of oil is done on the northern hemisphere and therefore demand tends to be higher during 
winter for this part of the world. According to Riley (2006), the prices have a tendency of 
moving in a cyclical pattern, where they are at their highest during the winter months. 
Especially harsh winters will drive the prices even further upward. 
An interesting variable is the role speculation plays in the creation of demand itself. 
Speculators buy oil products in the hope that the prices will increase in the world market. It 
has been said that much of the recent short term spikes in oil prices can be attributed to the 
varying demand by investors, most notably hedge fund managers. Hamilton (2008) states that 
speculators have been increasingly engaged in the market for oil futures, purchasing surplus 
contracts in the hope of earning a profit when the contracts are ready to be fulfilled. 
According to a recent article by Hall & Rankin (2011), speculation may account for 70 % of 
all oil futures contracts bought, and whose owners never intend on taking control over the 
physical oil. Twenty years ago this only accounted for 30 %, so there is no doubt that 
speculation more and more has to be taken into consideration. 
The limited supply of the world‟s hydrocarbon reserves is a long-term variable on the supply 
side. As new oilfields are discovered the size of proven reserves may increase, but the actual 
reserves in the earth‟s crust will diminish. By allocating economic resources to exploration, it 
will hopefully give the results of finding more economically viable fields, thus creating extra 
supply in the long run.  
Since petroleum is a finite resource, the question of how much is left is always a debated 
question, and an important factor in the price of oil. New discoveries of oil reserves are 
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continually made, although at a declining rate for most of the world. There are still large areas 
in many oil producing nations that remains unsurveyed in terms of potential future 
production. Much of these potential oil reserves is in control of state owned companies in 
authoritarian countries, like Saudi Aramco, and their estimates on the reserves left in a field is 
often not subject to the same amount of transparency as a western company would be. There 
is thus considerable uncertainty in determining the reserves left, and changes in the estimates, 
like a fully new discovery, will cause changes in the prices. Generally, when the estimates for 
reserves left go up, it will cause the price of oil to decrease. 
Technology is also a major factor in long term supply. As new technology is invented, the 
ability to extract petroleum from the fields will increase. Today, the efficiency of this process 
is lower than one third on a world average. This means that two thirds of the oil is still left in 
the field when it is abandoned, which it will be once continued production no longer is 
economically profitable.  
 
 
Figure 2.2(a,b,c): Supply and demand curves for oil 
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3 Value-at-risk and subadditivity 
 
Value-at-risk has become the standard tool in determining how risky an investment is. 
Chapter 3.1 contains a general description of portfolio diversification as a way to reduce risk. 
Value-at-risk itself is defined in Chapter 3.2. Chapter 3.3 and 3.4 explain why applying the 
diversification principle on VaR directly sometimes can generate errors. A heavily tailed and 
disjointed return distribution is considered to be the source of such violations of subadditivity. 
Chapter 3.5 defines skew and kurtosis as tools to describe a certain distribution, and Chapter 
3.6 contains a mathematical definition of heavy tailedness. 
 
3.1 Reducing risk through diversification 
The idea of diversifying investments, and not placing all eggs in the same basket, is intuitive 
and has to a certain degree always been practiced in economics. Still, it was not until the 
1950s that it progressed beyond mere heuristics, and became a science of itself through the 
work of Harry Markowitz. Prior to this, theory and what was considered good business 
practice diverged. To create a good portfolio, theory said it should be built with those assets 
which offered the highest return and the lowest risk. The composition of the portfolio itself 
did not matter. Experienced investors knew that in real-life markets this was a far too 
simplistic view.  
Markowitz (1959) details how portfolios could be constructed based on the total risk-return 
ratio, rather than merely focusing on the individual assets. A good composition could make 
the risks of different assets null each other out, thereby creating a less risky portfolio. He 
suggested that the value of an asset to an investor could best be evaluated by its mean, its 
standard deviation, and also to its correlation to other securities in the portfolio. 
The correlation between two assets X and Y, with expected returns μX and µY and standard 
deviations σX and σY, can be expressed: 
    (   )        
   (   )
    
  
 ((    )(    ))
    
 
The correlation should be a value between -1 and 1. A value of 1 means there is perfect 
correlation between the two assets, and they rise and fall in the same direction. A value of -1 
means perfect negative correlation, so the assets rise and fall in opposite directions. A value of 
0 means there is no relationship between the assets, they rise and fall independently of each 
other. 
If each asset is given a percentage weight wX and wY, so that the sum of the weights will be 1, 
the standard deviation of the total portfolio can be calculated as: 
      √  
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To demonstrate the reduced risk through diversification, consider a reasonably safe asset with 
σX = 10% and a more risky asset with σY = 20%, and zero correlation between them. If the 
portfolio consists only of the safe asset, portfolio standard deviation will be 10%, but if 20% 
of the weight instead had been on the risky asset, it would be 8,9%. In other words, by 
including some amount of the more risky asset, the total risk is actually reduced. 
The diversification principle is widely accepted as almost a universal truth about how to view 
financial portfolios. It still has a few critics, however. Holton (2008) argues that the eggs-in-
the-basket analogy not necessarily apply for financial risks. Instead he provides another 
example: Suggest someone is stranded on a desert island and finds three pools of water. He 
suspects one or more of them might be poisonous but do not know which one. He now has 
three choices: (1) randomly select one pool and drink exclusively from it, (2) randomly select 
two pools and drink from them, or (3) drink from all three pools. Common sense says he 
incurs the least risk by drinking only from one pool of water, yet portfolio theory says he 
should diversify and thus drink an equal amount from all three. This view on diversification is 
interesting but has not reached the mainstream and remains a fringe idea. 
 
3.2 What is value-at-risk? 
Value-at-risk is a single measure that tries to capture the risk of loss on a portfolio under 
normal fluctuations in the market. Perhaps the most common definition of this term is the one 
described by Jorion (2001): 
“VaR summarizes the worst loss over a target horizon (T) with a given level of confidence 
(α)”  
VaR therefore describes the lower quantile of the projected profit/loss-distribution (P&L). 
Using a historical sample size (T), the losses exceeding the VaR will only occur with a 
probability of 1 – α. Formally, this can be denoted: 
   ( )      *  |  ( )   + 
where F(x) is the cumulative probability function over the profit and loss x. Figure 3.1 gives 
an illustration of VaR. 
  
Figure 3.1 – VaR on a P&L distribution at 95% confidence level. 
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The drawback of this measure is that it does not give information about the losses that occur 
with a probability of less than 1 – α. VaR is incapable of distinguishing between situations 
where losses in the tail region are only a bit worse and situations where tail losses are 
overwhelming. Zikovic (2008) and many others argue that in practice this has a tendency to 
make risk estimates overly optimistic.  
 
3.3 Coherent measures of risk 
In 1997 Artzner et al. published a widely influential article called “Thinking Coherently”. 
There they defined that in order for a risk metric (r) to be coherent, as they called it, for any 
risks A and B (i.e. two random, independent monetary losses), it would need to satisfy these 
four logical properties: 
1. Monotonicity: If A ≥ B, then r (A) ≥ r (B) 
2. Positive homogeneity: for a ≥ 0, a r (A) = r (aA) 
3. Translation invariance: r (A + a) = r (A) – a 
4. Subadditivity: r (A + B) ≤ r (A) + r (B) 
The first property, monotonicity, states that if risk A is always larger than risk B, the risk 
measure should be able to reflect that under all circumstances. Homogeneity is about 
proportional scaling. The risk of 10 shares of some stock should be exactly 10 times the risk 
of a single share. The translation invariance is about adding cash to a portfolio to act as 
insurance against losses. If some amount of cash in a portfolio is invested in a safe asset (a), 
like a bank account, the portfolio risk should be reduced by this amount. Finally, subadditivity 
is the principle of reduced risk by diversification. The risk measure of a combined portfolio 
should never exceed the sum of its components. A merger should never in itself create extra 
risk. 
In their follow-up paper in 1999 called “Coherent measures of risk” Artzner et al. prove that 
value-at-risk satisfies the first three properties, but not the last one about subadditivity. They 
were thus able to claim that VaR was not a coherent measure of risk. Other methods of 
measuring risk can be shown to be coherent, and have been adopted by many risk managers. 
Expected shortfall (ES) is perhaps the most notable of these, and numerous academic papers 
are advocating it over VaR (In addition to Artzner et al. (1999), see Hull (2006) or Embrechts 
et al. for more info about ES). Nevertheless, value-at-risk continues to this day to be the risk 
metric of choice, mostly due to its comparative simplicity and ease-of-use. 
There are various ways to demonstrate lack of subadditivity. A good example of this was 
presented by Daníelsson et al. (2010) and is only a slight alteration of Artzner‟s original 
proof. Consider a portfolio of two identical but independent assets, X1 and X2. These are 
assumed to follow the standard normal distribution most of the time (µ=0, σ=1), but both are 
prone to random shocks, which occur with a probability of 0,04. A shock will generate a loss 
of 10. This can be denoted: 
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Expected loss on these assets will be: E(X1) = E(X2) = 0 + E(β) = 0 ∙ 0,96 – 10 ∙ 0,04 = -0,4. 
The variance is calculated: var(X1) = var(X2) = var(x+β) = 1 + var(β) = 1 + 10
2
 ∙ 0,04 = 5,0, 
which translates to a volatility (st. deviation) of about 2,24. Since only 4 % of the values will 
be centered around -10, calculating the value-at-risk at a 95% confidence level on total will be 
identical to calculating the (95+4)%-level for the distribution centered around 0. Thus, one 
gets: VaR(X1) = VaR(X2) = z0,95+0,04  = 2,326.  
VaR for the combined portfolio would lie somewhere between -9 and -10. This will 
necessarily mean:  
   (     )     (  )     (  )                 
As seen, the portfolio VaR is greater than the sum of the individual VaRs. This example is 
relevant for areas where there are possibilities of very severe events. The probability of 0,04 
for a shock occurring was chosen because it is only slightly smaller than the significance level 
for the individual risks. VaR would therefore be included in the main distribution. For the 
combined portfolio, however, the probability of at least one shock is 2 * 0,04 = 0,08. In this 
case, VaR would be situated somewhere in the “shock-distribution” centered around -10. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates how the VaR is moved when the portfolio is combined.  
The term superadditivity, as a word describing the opposite of subadditivity, has not yet 
gained widespread use among risk analysts. In this thesis, it will sometimes be applied to 
instances when VaR lacks subadditivity, along with the terms non-subadditive and 
subadditivity violation.  
 
 
Figure 3.2:  VaR for a single asset (X1) and for a combined portfolio (X1+X2). 
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3.4 The need for coherence in practice 
Some might claim that the need for coherence under all circumstances is not really necessary.  
Daníelsson et al. (2010) argues that subadditivity is only expected to be violated under two 
quite rare circumstances. These are: (1) Assets, whose probability distribution has a super-fat 
tail, and (2) when the confidence level is in the interior of the return distribution. VaR is 
otherwise expected to be subadditive, and could thus be assumed to be coherent for most risk 
managers 
In practice, it is only (1) that is relevant for most companies because the confidence level is 
always set fairly close to 1, and is therefore in the tail region. The historical return follows a 
distribution that has a fatter tail than the normal distribution, but most of the time this cannot 
be classified as super-fat tail (see section 3.6). It is still the case that subadditivity for VaR is 
violated under some circumstances, and it is often under these that the need for a good risk 
measure is the greatest.  
The advantage of having a subadditive risk measure is that by adding the individual risks 
together, the sum of these will always overestimate the risk for the combined portfolio. This 
would then be used as a conservative estimate of the combined risk, and one could always be 
certain that the real combined risk was equal or smaller than this number. In an organization 
where decision making is decentralized, for example where individual commodity traders 
have a large amount of personal freedom to engage in trading, the sum of the reported 
individual risks could then be used as a maximum for the total risk the organization faces.  
Since value-at-risk is not a subadditive risk measure, merely adding the VaR-numbers 
together gives nothing of real value and could actually be truly misleading if used 
indiscriminately. 
Traders might be tempted to break up their portfolio into separate accounts for each risk 
incurred. The traders are ordered to fulfill margin requirements, but since the individual risks 
could add up to less than the total risk, they might actually be able to reduce their margin 
requirements by splitting their portfolios into parts. Similarly, this might give incentives for 
banks to break up in order to reduce their regulatory capital requirements. The total capital 
requirements of all the smaller banks could be less than the total capital requirement for the 
large bank, while in reality the risks are generally greater for small banks. Garcia et al. (2005) 
states that subadditivity is a required property in connection with the aggregation of risks 
across desks, business units, accounts, or subsidiary companies. Also, they argue that it ought 
to be a greater concern to regulators where firms might be motivated to break up into affiliates 
to satisfy capital requirements. 
 
3.5 Skewness and leptokurtosis 
The normal distribution is often used to describe a number of different phenomena. Its use in 
risk estimation is limited due to its tendency to neglect extreme outcomes. Asset return 
distributions often follow something that resembles the normal distribution, but which is 
skewed to one side and contain leptokurtosis, or heavy-tailedness. A number of papers have 
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investigated the distribution of historical financial data and the conclusion has been that 
skewness and leptokurtosis are general characteristics of financial data. 
Papers specifically discussing the loss distribution of energy derivatives, on the other hand, 
are far less numerous. Giot and Laurent (2003) investigate returns on WTI-crude and find that 
it displays negative skewness and leptokurtosis. The parametric approach of RiskMetrics was 
found to be very ill suited for simulating this loss distribution, especially at higher confidence 
levels.  
A similar simulation on Brent benchmark crude oil gives the same results. In the histogram in 
Figure 3.3, the blue curve denotes the fitted normal distribution and the red columns show the 
direct historical data of P&L the in the period: October 2002 – December 2008. As seen, the 
actual data is skewed slightly to the right, thus having a negative skew. The actual data also 
exhibit occasional extreme losses and extreme gains that are not captured by the normal 
distribution.  
Both skewness and kurtosis can be expressed in mathematical terms, using the concept of 
moments. The n-th mathematical moment Mn is defined as: 
    
 (   ) 
  
 
The moment is normalized, meaning it is a dimensionless number. 
The first moment is equal to the mean value and the second moment is equal to the variance. 
The third moment denotes the skewness, and the kurtosis could be described using n = 4. 
Using adjustments for a limited sample size N, the skewness could be calculated:  
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If skewness is a positive number, the distribution is skewed to the right, while negative 
skewness indicates skew to the left. A pure normal distribution, or one otherwise 
symmetrically distributed around a mean value, would have a skew = 0. 
Similarly, the forth moment, the kurtosis, could be calculated: 
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If the kurtosis is a positive number, the distribution exhibits fatter tails than the normal 
distribution. On the other hand, a negative number means the distribution decreases more 
quickly with deviations from the mean. A second effect of the fourth moment is that an 
increase will cause the top of the distribution will become more pointy, whereas a decrease 
will make it rounder.  
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Skew and kurtosis is easily calculated in Excel using the SKEW and KURT functions, 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Real data compared to the normal distribution. The real data shows skew to the right and 
leptokurtosis compared with the normal distribution. The fourth moment is calculated to be 2,346. 
 
3.6 Fat and super-fat tails 
The normal distribution is often used to describe a number of different phenomena. Its use in 
risk estimation is limited due to its tendency to neglect extreme outcomes. Asset return 
distributions often follow something that resembles the normal distribution, but which has 
leptokurtosis, or heavy-tailedness. 
The common definition of leptokurtosis is when the kurtosis is higher than the normal 
kurtosis, that is when the fourth moment as calculated with the formula in the previous 
chapter, is larger than 0. This is a simple and workable definition, but in many cases perhaps 
too simple. The fourth moment only captures the mass in the center of the distribution 
compared with that in the tails. If the tail is not continuous and smooth, but truncated like in 
the example in Figure 3.2, the relative mass of the tail may be small, and the fourth moment 
will only show a slight increase in kurtosis. As seen, in these cases a combined portfolio may 
display lack of subadditivity. 
Daníelsson et al (2010) introduces an alternative definition of fat tailedness. Their definition 
states that a distribution is fat tailed if the cumulative distribution is varying regularly when 
the time period approaches infinity. Formally, this can be described: 
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             (  )      ( )             
Here, β > 0 is a constant known as the tail index of the distribution. In order to make the 
implication above true, g(x) must be a function that is slowly varying which converges to 1 at 
infinity: g(tx)/g(t) →1 if t→∞. An example of such a function would be a logarithm. The 
density function can be obtained by deriving the cumulative function. In the extreme tail 
region x is sufficiently large that this could be approximated as: 
 (  )   
  
  
    ( )        
This means that the density declines at the power rate x
-β-1
 in the tail region. This creates a 
considerably fatter tail than the normal distribution. The fatness of the tail depends on the tail 
index, where larger β would make the function decline more rapidly.  
The tail index is often related to the moments, and the function could be described by how 
many bounded moments it has. The n-th moment is said to be bounded if Mn > β. The 
moments larger than the tail index are known as unbounded. The mean is known to be 
bounded for most financial assets, and often the variance is bounded as well. Under these 
circumstances, the tail is elongated compared to the normal distribution but it is still a smooth 
declining graph,  
For 0 < β < 1, however, there are no bounded moments. In the extreme tail regions, the 
density function do not follow a smooth graph, but the data falling here may be inter-
dispersed by very rare events that results in extremely large losses. These are sometimes 
known as super-fat tails. 
VaR can be shown to be subadditive for all stable distributions when the first moment is 
bounded. Ibragimov (2005) displayed that this is true even for extremely volatile assets, even 
up to the variance approaching infinity, as long as β>1. If the distribution is not too heavy-
tailed, most economic models are quite robust toward heavy-tailedness assumptions. 
However, when the distribution instead has long tailed density, these implications are 
reversed.  
Markets that grant loss distributions with an unbounded mean are not very common. Markets 
for weather insurance contracts are characterized by having long periods of relative calm. But 
once a weather catastrophe occurs, the holders of such contracts could suffer extreme losses. 
Even in these markets, the tail index is known to be hovering just around 1. This has led many 
analysts to defend the use of value-at-risk as the standard risk measure against those who 
criticize it for its universal lack of subadditivity. 
The commodity markets have not been particularly well researched in terms of its tail index. 
One of the classic texts in tail behavior is Mandelbrot (1963), which analyzed that of 
historical cotton prices. Here, the tail index is estimated to be approximately 1,7. Given the 
properties of oil markets, as discussed in Chapter 2.2, one might suspect that especially the 
market for oil products would have an even lower tail index.  
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4 Historical simulation 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the historical simulation, which is the most common 
method of calculating value-at-risk.  Chapter 4.1 describes the actual method of performing 
the simulation, and Chapter 4.2 discusses why historical simulation has become so popular 
along with some important weaknesses. Backtesting is described in Chapter 4.3 as a way of 
checking how well the simulation has performed in the past. 
 
4.1 General 
Value-at-risk has since its infancy gained widespread recognition as the primary tool for 
measuring market risk, even considering its known lack of universal subadditivity. But even if 
there is agreement on the use of VaR, the matter of actually calculating VaR itself is very 
much under debate. Three main categories of methods have arisen since the early 1990s: The 
parametric method, the historical method and the use of Monte Carlo simulation, with a wide 
array of different approaches within each category. Each of these methods offers certain 
strengths and weaknesses, and the difficulty of reaching a consensus on which one is the best 
is due to the fact that there are differences in what the goal of VaR is. For one, the choice of 
method may depend on the number and type of assets that is to be examined, and secondly to 
the objective which VaR is supposed to accomplish. The risk manager will have to weigh and 
compare the tradeoffs between the various methods for each individual case. 
Historical simulation is based on direct empirical data and the quantile of the sample. To do 
this simulation, data of the historical daily returns on a portfolio of n risk factors must be 
collected over an observation period T. The relative weight of risk factor i in the portfolio is 
denoted wi, while the return on the risk factor i over the period t is denoted Ri,t. The portfolio 
return (or more accurately P&L) over period t can thus be calculated as: 
  
   ∑      
 
   
 
Here, observations are made from period t=0 to t=T, so a total number of T portfolio returns 
are acquired. T is the size of the sample and could be any number. The standard sample size 
used at Statoil is T=1000, approximately four year of trading days. Portfolio P&L can then be 
plotted into a histogram and the daily α-VaR can be read off as the (1- α)-th lower quantile of 
the distribution. For example, if T=1000 and α=0,95, then VaR will be 50th largest daily loss. 
In Microsoft Excel there is a function called SMALL which returns the n-th smallest number 
from an array of numbers. This has been used to simulate long positions, while a similar 
function called LARGE is used for short positions. 
The daily return on the individual risk factors is calculated using the logarithmic difference 
between the price on day t and day t-1. Historical prices are either open source, collected in-
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house or attained from companies specialized in collecting data, such as Platts. The formula 
for log-returns is: 
     (
  
    
) 
The two main alternative methods to historical simulation is parametric VaR and Monte Carlo 
simulation. Calculating VaR parametrically requires the analyst to assume the return 
distribution to be stated with a particular mathematical function. The most common of these 
would be the normal distribution where the expected value and standard deviation would be 
the parameters used. Monte Carlo simulation refers to any method that randomly generates 
trials, but by itself does not tell anything about the underlying methodology. Components of 
these could be incorporated into the historical simulation such as through volatility adjustment 
or weighting schemes, further discussed in Chapter 5.6. 
 
4.2 Strengths and weaknesses 
Historical simulation is a simple method that is easily understood not only by the risk 
managers themselves, but by non-specialists as well, making it attractive for senior 
management in many organizations that may not have in-depth knowledge of the process. 
This method does not require calculation of correlations between the individual assets. For 
complicated positions with numerous risk factors, where estimating correlations otherwise 
would have to be made using variance-covariance matrices, historical simulation eases the 
computational workload considerably. Using less complicated estimation techniques also 
reduces the chances of incurring model risk, the risk of using an inadequate or inappropriate 
model to measuring risk. 
HS does not require any assumption on the distribution of the profit and loss, such as normal, 
student-t or any other. It does not even need to assume that the returns are independently 
distributed, making the tendency of volatile returns to cluster together much less of a problem. 
Fat tails, which are difficult to estimate parametrically, are also well reflected using direct 
data sets.   
There are still limitations and problems associated with historical simulation. The most severe 
of these is arguably the need for complete reliance on one particular data set. The HS 
approach thus assumes that the future will be like the past, that the particular data set gives an 
accurate picture on the future risks. When markets go through longer periods of relative calm, 
this assumption generally holds quite well. But since the quiet periods often are abruptly 
followed by periods of violent fluctuations, the historical approach can be rather slow to adapt 
to this and the VaR estimates tend to be too low for quite some time. On the other hand, if 
markets have been volatile in the past, but is about to go into a calmer period, the estimate 
remains too high.  
The choice of sample size can be a crucial one for creating an effective historical model. 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 shows how different the historical VaR may be for different sample 
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periods. Not only is there an absolute difference between the three graphs, but the calculated 
VaRs sometimes seem to move in opposite directions. Figure 4.3 compares the VaRs 
calculated using the historical simulation and ones calculated through the delta-normal 
parametric method. As expected because of heavy-tailedness, historical simulation overall 
gives a larger VaR than the parametric. Using a larger sample size reduces the difference 
between the two methods. 
The lack of consensus on the choice of sample size is due to a tradeoff involved between 
accuracy and flexibility. To account well for losses incurred in the tail region of the 
distribution, a large sample size is necessary. Otherwise, there will not be enough 
observations to make a continuous graph. The distribution will instead be disjointed. As seen 
in Figure 3.3, the data in the tail region can be very disjointed, even when the data goes back 
six years. It would be quite illogical to conclude that this exact distribution would continue in 
the future. The higher the confidence level, the longer observation period is needed.  
On the other hand, since the futures markets are shown to be heteroskedastic and undergo 
systematic changes in volatility, a long observation period will make it rely too heavily on 
returns in the distant past. As seen in Figure 4.1, longer sample sizes makes the model slow to 
react to changes in volatility and it also tends to lag longer on high VaR after the worst 
fluctuations have ceased. This is even more clearly illustrated in Figure 4.4, where data from 
the relatively volatile recent period have been examined. Only the very small sampled VaR is 
able to capture the increased volatility during late 2008 and early 2009 in a satisfying way, 
albeit with a certain lag. Using sample sizes of 250 and 500, the charted VaR shows very little 
resemblance to the volatility actually experienced. The rise and fall of the historical VaR is 
therefore often rather arbitrary, and even more so with increased sample size. 
 
Figure 4.1: Historical 95%-VaR for Brent crude, using three small sample sizes. 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
aug 11, 1987 aug 11, 1993 aug 12, 1999 aug 12, 2005 aug 13, 2011
100
250
500
26 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Historical 95%-VaR for Brent crude, using three large sample sizes. A comparison with 
the actual P&L is also included in grey. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Difference between historical 95%-VaR and delta normal 95%-VaR for sample sizes 100, 
250 and 500 on daily return on Brent crude. 
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Figure 4.4: Development of historical VaR the last three years using periods 100, 250 and 500. In 
grey are the percentile daily P&L for Brent crude shown. 
 
4.3 Backtesting 
The preferred method of testing whether VaR is able to predict the real risk is to look back 
and see how well it has performed in the past. If the confidence level is 95%, one would 
expect that losses exceeding the VaR-number to occur roughly 5% of the days. If the more 
than 5% of the losses exceed the VaR-number, then the model has underestimated the risk. If, 
on the other hand, losses exceeding VaR occur less than 5%, the model is too conservative 
and overestimates the risk. The former causes the trader to keep too little capital in reserve to 
be able to cover losses, while the latter causes too much capital to be kept and thus may result 
in ineffective use of resources.  
Backtesting is performed using a rolling windows approach. The estimation sample is rolled 
over the whole data period but the length of the window is kept constant, the first beginning at 
the earliest data in the time series of historical returns. Backtesting involves assuming that the 
loss distribution is a Bernoulli variable. A Bernoulli variable may only take the form of one of 
two values, where „success‟ is labeled 1 and „failure‟ is labeled 0.  In this case, success means 
that the loss today has exceeded yesterday‟s VaR. An indicator function that displays this can 
be defined as: 
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If the VaR number is correct, then the probability of exceeding the VaR should be: 
 (       )       
Further, the Bernoulli process could be extended to a binomial distribution. Defining S as the 
sum of all the violations of the VaR-number with a sample size n: 
   (   )   ∑     
 
   
 
then the expected number and its standard deviation can be described as: 
 ( )                ( )  √  (   ) 
Assuming that the central limit theorem applies when n is a large number, the distribution for 
S is approximately normal. A 1-θ confidence interval can then be constructed from these data: 
(     √  (          √  (   ) 
A hypothesis test is then performed with a null hypothesis H0: S = nα. This will be rejected if 
the number of violations falls outside the confidence interval. The normality assumption does 
not necessarily hold true, especially considering that a sufficiently large n not always will be 
available. Whether or not a hypothesis is rejected is also heavily dependent on the choice of 
significance level, which in itself is rather arbitrary. For this purpose a θ = 0,05 will be used. 
Table 4.1 shows a backtest performed on a portfolio of 100% Brent crude, the VaR 
development of which was shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. As can be seen, performing 
backtests on VaR with a small VaR period is practically impossible. The number of 
exceedances is too small to gain any valuable information and whether or not the backtest 
succeeds is too dependent on single dates. 
 
 
VaR period (days) 
     n (days) 100 250 500 1000 2000   E(S) SD(S) Min Max 
100 3 0 0 0 0 
 
5 2,18 0,7 9,3 
250 9 6 0 3 5 
 
12,5 3,45 5,7 19,3 
500 14 7 5 12 16 
 
25 4,87 15,4 34,6 
1000 43 46 49 57 56 
 
50 6,89 36,5 63,5 
2000 72 93 91 94 84 
 
100 9,75 80,9 119,1 
5000 203 250 245 263 246   250 15,41 219,8 280,2 
 
Table 4.1: Backtest for the n latest calculated historical VaRs at March 1st 2011. Different VaR 
periods have been used to illustrate how well it performs. To the right are shown the expected number 
of exceedance and the 95% confidence interval. Where the backtest fails has been marked red. 
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The same is true for small sample sizes. At n=100, the number of exceedances is actually zero 
for periods over 250 days. The backtest seems to fail at sample sizes below 1000. To account 
for that, the confidence interval is relatively wider when compared to long backtests, but the 
normal distribution is not fully able to capture that. A fatter tailed distribution might be able to 
account better for that, but most likely small sampled backtesting ought to be avoided 
altogether.  
While the Table 4.2 only shows the backtest for a single day, one can keep rolling the backtest 
itself. Figure 4.5 shows S as a function of time where the backtest window is the last 1000 
trading days at a given time. The performance of this middle range backtests shows that the 
lower the VaR period, the less frequently S goes beyond its theoretical bounds. For the graph 
for a VaR period of 2000 days the confidence interval was actually exceeded constantly for 
more than four years in the period between October 1997 and April 2002. The performance of 
the 500 VaR backtest on the other hand was remarkably good, keeping well inside the 
confidence interval even during volatile periods. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Rolling backtest with a sample size of 1000 at 95% confidence level for the fluctuating 
prices of Brent crude. The minimum and maximum allowed by the confidence interval in Table 5.2 is 
S=36 and S=63 
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5 Data analysis and results 
 
The thesis uses data from the oil markets in performing historical simulation. Chapter 5.1 
discusses the data in detail, explaining how a real position has been simplified to be easier to 
analyze. Chapter 5.2 introduces eight portfolio combinations to be checked for subadditivity. 
Single-day tests are explained in chapter 5.3 while their resulting figures are shown in 
appendix A. This has been stretched over a testing period in chapter 5.4, where a backtest has 
been constructed to see how often a particular portfolio displays subadditivity over time. 
Chapter 5.5 discusses the relationship between correlation and subadditivity, while chapter 
5.6 offers some ways to reduce the amount of superadditivity through parametrical 
adjustments. 
 
5.1 Empirical data 
Real data from a financial portfolio at Statoil has been used as data for this analysis. As the 
various traders at Statoil engage in trading, the collective portfolio for the company as a 
whole becomes very complicated. It holds a wide array of different types of products, each 
with a different maturity date.  
To analyze a complete position such as this is almost impossible, so some simplifications 
need to be done. Certain products tend to dominate trading. For Statoil, these are Brent and 
WTI crudes. In addition to these, a highly variable position in Middle Eastern heavy crudes 
seems to have a substantial impact on the portfolio. These are mainly Dubai oils, and come in 
a more rigid contract form like a forward or swap. The most important of the refined products 
is gasoline, which itself is mostly traded though futures contracts. 
The length of these contracts can vary between a single day and up to four years in the future. 
Still, the trade is highly dominated by contracts with a maturity date which is three months or 
less from now.   
On the request of Statoil, the actual values of the positions have not been included. The 
positions relative to the total position is shown in Table 5.1. The historical prices, on the other 
hand, are accurate. These have been collected in-house starting from April 1
st
 2003. The 
registered price data on a particular exchange is known as a ticker. The tickers included in this 
analysis are 
 
A. IPE-BRT-FUT1 
B. PLA-BRT-DTD1 
C. NYM-WTI-FUT  
D. PLA-DUB-SWP  
E. NYM-UNL-FUT 
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The first abbreviation tells by which institution the prices have been collected. IPE is an old, 
but still used code for the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in London. NYM is the code that 
indicates the product to be traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). 
Products that are traded over-the-counter do not have official data like this. Rather, a 
company known as Platts specializes in collecting data for OTC-products. PLA then indicates 
that data is from Platts. 
The second code is the physical product itself. BRT = Brent crude, WTI = Western Texas 
Intermediate, DUB = Dubai, UNL = Unleaded gasoline.  
The third code points to which financial instrument that is used. FUT means future, SWP 
means swap, while DTD indicates that the crude is dated. The last term only applies to Brent 
oil and it means that the shipment has received a date on which oil will be loaded onto a 
tanker. If the cargo does not have a designated loading date, it is known as a paper barrel. 
This is used mainly for hedging purposes or speculation. If the last code contains a 1 at the 
end, the product is traded on the European markets, whereas no number means the product is 
traded elsewhere. 
The price data consists of contracts with a maturity date within three months. Price data for 
spot price, 1 month, 2 months and 3 months contracts are used. There is in fact much more 
detailed price data available, stating the contract length in weeks or even days, but in order to 
make things simple, only the monthly prices are presented. The approximation used is that 
contracts with a maturity date within month uses the spot price, ones with a maturity time 
between one and two months uses the one month futures price, and so on.  
From now on the contracts will be abbreviated with codes stating products and maturity 
lengths. For example, the two month swap contract on product D, Dubai crude, will be called 
D.2. Unfortunately, for product C price data was only available for up two months, so there 
the three month future had to be omitted.  
 
  Maturity month Sum up 
to 3 
months 
Sum all 
months  Product March April May June 
A IPE-BRT-FUT1 2,61 % 14,351 % 6,916 % 2,906 % 26,783 % 33,405 % 
B PLA-BRT-DTD1 1,32 % 20,76 % 3,37 % 1,91 % 27,36 % 31,09 % 
C NYM-WTI-FUT 2,14 % 2,03 % 2,52 % 1,86 % 8,55 % 8,99 % 
D PLA-DUB-SWP 1,11 % 2,96 % 0,49 % 0,18 % 4,73 % 4,73 % 
E NYM-UNL-FUT 2,77 % 0,55 % 1,25 % 0,49 % 5,06 % 5,38 % 
 Sum these products 9,94 % 40,65 % 14,54 % 7,35 %   
 Sum all products 13,05 % 44,24 % 17,80 % 8,47 % Total: 72,48 % 
 
Table 5.1: The relative sizes of the positions at March 3th 2011. Simplifying to five products and 
maturity length of less than 3 months, one is able to capture 72 % of the total position. Short positions 
are in red, but are in this particular case calculated as positive numbers. 
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Much of the price data is highly correlated, as could be expected. Figure 5.1 shows how the 
prices for different contract lengths move in very similar fashion. Both the short term and the 
long term development of the spot price are emulated closely by the futures prices. For this 
particular product, there seems to have been contango during most of the period.  
The correlation matrix in Table 5.2 measures how similar the prices moves. The correlation 
factors between two products are calculated according to the formula defined in Chapter 3.2. 
The correlation between all of the crude product combinations goes below 0,98. Product E on 
the other hand is a commercial product and sold on a market that differs some from the crude 
market, as discussed in Chapter 2.3. It is therefore not surprising to observe a considerably 
lower correlation factor when comparing this product with the others. The correlation factor 
for these data seems approximately to lie in the interval [0,96 , 0,98].  
Figure 5.2 reveals that the long term development is similar both for crude and refined 
products, but the short term fluctuations may be very different. The refined product seems to 
be more prone to bubbles and bursts and exhibits a higher degree of volatility clustering. The 
correlation is heavily dependent on the amount of data used to calculate it. From smaller 
samples the correlation would often be considerably less. The long-term correlation between 
crude oil and refined products was noted in a study by Asche et al. (2003), and was shown to 
be very high for most combinations of light and middle distillates, as well as naphta. The 
correlation between crude oil and heavy distillates was on the other hand found to be 
relatively low. 
All of the products tested exhibit leptokurtosis compared to the normal distribution. 
Somewhat surprising was the how much this differed from product to product. As shown in 
Table 5.3, prices for Brent contracts seem to be the considerably less volatile than the other 
two crudes, having a kurtosis of roughly one third compared to that of WTI and Dubai crude.  
The standard deviation reflects this rather poorly, as it is only slightly lower. This leads to the 
conclusion that it would be a bad choice of risk measure, and thus that VaR based purely on 
an assumption on normality would be equally ineffective. 
For the two Brent contracts and the gasoline, the kurtosis is higher for when the maturity 
length is short. This is most dramatically seen for gasoline, where the spot price exhibits a 
kurtosis of 8,5 the two month futures price only has a kurtosis of 2,6. This is probably due to 
the traders‟ knowledge of the price behavior, and the tendency for bubbles and bursts. For 
WTI and Dubai crudes this is reversed, and short term contracts seem to have the lowest 
kurtosis. 
WTI and Dubai prices also have the highest skewedness.  They are all skewed quite heavily 
toward the profit side compared with the symmetrical normal distribution, except for the two 
month WTI future where it is suddenly skewed clearly toward the loss side. Most the other 
data only show a low skew. 
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Figure 5.1: Development of the prices of the product IPE-BRT-FUT1. Shown is the spot price along 
with futures contracts with length 3 month. Correlation factor = 0,9966 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Comparison between the spot prices for Dubai crude swaps and unleaded gasoline. 
Correlation factor = 0,9612  
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Table 5.2: Correlation between the prices of the different products 
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# Product 
Maturity 
length 
Mean Median Min Max St. dev. Skew Kurtosis 
1 
IPE-BRT-
FUT1 
Spot 0,072 % 0,034 % -12,533 % 11,851 % 2,232 % -0,1286 2,9094 
1M 0,074 % 0,019 % -11,223 % 12,305 % 2,076 % -0,0125 2,7515 
2M 0,075 % 0,020 % -10,600 % 11,307 % 2,018 % -0,0214 2,5362 
3M 0,075 % 0,025 % -10,138 % 10,514 % 1,972 % -0,0292 2,3891 
2 
PLA-
BRT-
DTD1 
Spot 0,072 % 0,010 % -12,816 % 13,719 % 2,231 % -0,0734 3,1300 
1M 0,073 % 0,022 % -11,994 % 12,902 % 2,152 % -0,0047 3,1857 
2M 0,073 % 0,028 % -11,679 % 12,651 % 2,125 % 0,0106 3,1651 
3M 0,074 % 0,015 % -10,805 % 11,451 % 2,028 % -0,0064 2,8460 
3 
NYM-
WTI-FUT 
Spot 0,061 % 0,000 % -21,155 % 24,077 % 2,604 % 0,23382 9,3879 
1M 0,062 % 0,000 % -20,704 % 23,402 % 2,389 % 0,11799 9,2309 
2M 0,066 % 0,000 % -24,793 % 21,541 % 2,357 % -0,1201 14,384 
3M - - - - - - - 
4 
PLA-
DUB-
SWP 
Spot 0,077 % 0,000 % -17,003 % 18,478 % 2,597 % 0,12897 10,232 
1M 0,076 % 0,000 % -17,003 % 18,478 % 2,597 % 0,12990 10,236 
2M 0,077 % 0,000 % -17,555 % 19,031 % 2,585 % 0,11641 11,344 
3M 0,078 % 0,000 % -17,863 % 19,693 % 2,587 % 0,10567 11,880 
5 
NYM-
UNL-
FUT 
Spot 0,061 % 0,000 % -24,979 % 25,013 % 2,754 % -0,0248 8,5219 
1M 0,061 % 0,000 % -16,072 % 19,913 % 2,589 % -0,0070 4,0361 
2M 0,061 % 0,000 % -11,227 % 13,441 % 2,380 % -0,0398 2,5840 
3M 0,062 % 0,000 % -11,009 % 11,591 % 2,252 % -0,0537 2,5565 
 
Table 5.3: Analysis of the historical daily profits and losses for the different contracts. The entire 
sample is used (N=2092). 
 
5.2 Portfolio selection 
Putting together portfolios from the assets presented in Table 5.3 is an action that presents a 
number of challenges. An infinite number of different portfolios could theoretically be created 
and thus an infinite number of results would be possible to acquire.  
In my work I have attempted numerous portfolio compositions and most of them results in 
very chaotic and highly sensitive results. Two opposing goals soon presented themselves. On 
one hand, it is preferable to keep things as simple as possible. A portfolio with only a few 
different contracts would have a low number of variables. It should then be easier to track 
which of these are impacting the portfolio as a whole. 
On the other hand, simple portfolios are perhaps not too relevant for large corporations with 
as complex a position as Statoil‟s. Often complexity can cause novel effects to occur, that do 
not apply when only a few variables are taken into account. The argument that subadditivity 
violations only apply on the level of individual traders, but are neutralized at the managerial 
level when the traders are part of a greater organization, is an equally important aspect. 
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Test # Portfolio A Portfolio B 
1 $1000 of A.0 $1000 of A.1 
2 $1000 of D.0 $1000 of D.2 
3 $1000 of B.0 $1000 of E.1 
4 $1000 each of D.0 + D.3 + E.2 $1000 each of C.0 + D.2 + E.2 
5 $1000 of A.0. -$1000 of A.1 
6 -$1000 of A.0 -$1000 of A.1 
 
Table 5.4: Six simple portfolio combinations used in the tests for subadditivity. Negative numbers 
mean short positions 
 
In the end the test results presented here are performed on six positions that should be 
considered simple, and two that could be considered complex. In creating the complex 
portfolios, the actual position of Statoil at March 3th 2011 has been a guiding principle, but is 
not actually reproduced. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 presents the positions used in checking for 
subadditivity. 
The first test combines two very correlated portfolios containing a single asset each 
(corr.=0,999). Both of these assets are common and are traded with the most flexible 
instrument, the futures contract. This should be representative as the most standardized of all 
portfolio combinations. 
Test 2 is very similar to the first test, but the product it holds is less common and the contract 
type is less flexible. The historical prices for these contracts also display a high amount of 
kurtosis, compared with those in the first test. Test 3 combines two portfolios of very different 
products, one is a crude oil and the other is a refined product. The correlation here is 
noticeably less. Test 4 creates a middle ground between a simple and a complex portfolio. 
Test 5 makes a long and short position neutralize each other. Test 6 combines two short 
positions. 
The portfolios in tests 7 and 8 are based loosely on the relative sizes of the real position 
presented in Table 5.1. Test 7 places all the Brent contracts in portfolio A while all the 
contracts for other products are placed in portfolio B. The last test places all the long positions 
in one portfolio and all the short ones in the other. 
 
  IPE-BRT-FUT1 PLA-BRT-DTD1 
NYM-
WTI-FUT 
PLA-DUB-SWP NYM-UNL-FUT 
#  0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
7 
A 30 160 80 30 10 230 40 20            
B         20 20 30 10 30 5 0 30 5 10 5 
8 
A    30  230  20   30 10 30 5 0     
B 30 160 80  10  40  20 20      30 5 10 5 
 
Table 5.5: The complex portfolio combinations used in the tests for subadditivity. Black marks long 
positions and red marks short positions. 
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5.3 Single-day subadditivity testing 
The criterion for subadditivity can be written as:  r (A) + r (B) - r (A + B) ≥ 0. If the risk 
measure is value-at-risk, ideally, the sum of the historical VaRs for the individual portfolios 
minus the VaR for the combined portfolio should always be larger than zero. When this 
criterion is not satisfied, subadditivity is violated. This should be true for all confidence levels 
and all time horizons. Table 5.6 shows this criterion employed in practice at a single day on 
the positions described in the previous chapter. The tests are performed at confidence levels 
95% and 99% and with historical samples going back 250, 500 and 1000 days, respectively. 
As seen, most of the time the subadditivity criterion is satisfied, but in a small number of 
cases the VaR  the combined portfolio is larger than the sum of the individual VaRs. In this 
particular case, the superadditivity is present at 3 out of 48 instances. 
Because of the nature of historical simulation, the tail region of the loss distribution will 
always be coarse and discontinuous. Each day there will almost certainly be some parts of the 
tail where subadditivity is not satisfied. Figure 5.3 illustrates this by combining two simple 
portfolios. Portfolio A contains $1000 of Product A with maturity date less than one month 
(using the spot price), and portfolio B contains $1000 of the same product but uses the one 
month futures price. The graphs display the difference between the sum of the individual 
VaRs and that for the combined portfolio. At some confidence levels this value is below zero. 
Note that the results are not dependent on the absolute sizes of the positions, only the weight 
ratio between them. 
There does not appear to be any clear pattern as to at which confidence levels subadditivity is 
most likely to be violated. They are just as likely to occur at lower levels like α = 95% as 
higher levels like α = 99%. This is unexpected as the distribution tends to get more disjointed 
the farther out in the tail regions the observations are made, and one would have expected that 
to cause additional violations.  
A larger sample size makes the fluctuations in the function be reduced, as should be expected, 
but the amount of subadditivity violations seems to be about the same.  
More tests have been performed on other simple portfolios. The results of these are shown in 
Figures A.1-A.7 in the appendix. Here subadditivity violations occur in at least some 
confidence levels for Tests 2, 4, 6 and 7, while the others are subadditive at all confidence 
levels. For Tests 3 and 8, the resulting additivity plot creates something that resembles 
continuous graphs that decrease as the confidence level is lowered. 
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# 
 HistVaR at α=95% HistVaR at α=99% 
 A B A+B Diff A B A+B Diff 
1 
250 25,96 25,41 51,10 0,27 41,16 41,50 82,28 0,38 
500 31,21 29,93 60,52 0,62 47,68 44,24 84,52 7,40 
1000 37,98 36,30 74,00 0,29 74,87 67,69 140,09 2,48 
2 
250 23,99 24,27 37,23 11,03 39,66 40,53 64,38 15,81 
500 31,29 31,77 41,01 22,05 42,30 41,56 67,18 16,68 
1000 36,51 36,75 67,33 5,94 68,11 66,16 134,27 0,00 
3 
250 26,14 28,90 43,00 12,04 39,89 46,67 69,28 17,28 
500 29,82 31,23 46,86 14,19 43,77 48,51 74,14 18,14 
1000 38,61 43,48 67,99 14,10 73,72 81,32 118,38 36,66 
4 
250 64,13 62,85 126,34 0,64 91,88 100,52 192,40 0,00 
500 65,48 67,41 129,54 3,35 106,86 111,63 215,88 2,61 
1000 91,76 99,78 195,69 -4,15 157,46 173,48 326,50 4,45 
5 
250 25,96 26,99 5,59 47,36 41,16 39,94 18,31 62,79 
500 31,21 30,71 5,91 56,02 47,68 44,30 21,86 70,13 
1000 37,98 33,92 8,95 62,95 74,87 69,04 22,97 120,94 
6 
250 27,02 26,99 52,12 1,88 43,90 39,94 83,84 0,00 
500 31,61 30,71 59,94 2,39 44,59 44,30 87,81 1,08 
1000 35,66 33,92 67,47 2,11 76,61 69,04 148,18 -2,53 
7 
250 15,03 3,36 18,66 -0,27 23,96 5,35 28,15 1,15 
500 18,14 3,58 21,67 0,05 26,10 5,94 29,52 2,51 
1000 22,36 5,18 26,64 0,91 40,73 9,00 48,34 1,38 
8 
250 8,27 10,17 2,10 16,34 13,10 16,18 4,38 24,90 
500 9,85 11,13 2,37 18,60 13,94 16,43 4,03 26,35 
1000 12,69 12,92 3,01 22,61 23,25 27,06 5,40 44,91 
 
Table 5.6: Overview of the individual subadditivity tests on the date March 3th 2011. The column 
labeled “Diff” subtracts the A+B column from the sum of the A and B columns. Subadditivity is 
violated where this gives a negative number. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Single-day test: Portfolio A: $1000 of A.0.   Portfolio B: $1000 of A.1 
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5.4 Subadditivity backtesting 
Backtesting akin to that discussed in Chapter 4.5 is also possible when considering 
subadditivity violations. An indicator function must be adopted with a Bernoulli variable such 
that it returns 1 when subadditivity is violated and 0 when it is satisfied.  
 
       {
      ( )      ( )     (   )    
     ( )      ( )     (   )    
 
 
This backtest will have to be used at set confidence levels. The ones chosen for this purpose 
are α = 95% and α = 99%. The sum of these variables can then be divided with the total 
number of days to acquire a percentage of how often the subadditivity principle is violated. 
Table 5.7 shows a summary of the backtests performed on the portfolios mentioned in 
Chapter 5.2. Short backtesting periods were shown to be very inaccurate for these kinds of 
historical prices, as seen in Chapter 4.3. Also, price data stretching back 2000 days or more 
was not available for all products. Therefore, 1000 days was chosen as the sole backtesting 
period for this purpose. 
In this summary are shown the amount of time that subadditivity is violated. This would 
translate to how often the graphs in Figure 5.4 and 5.5 are below zero. As seen, violations of 
the subadditivity axiom can be quite substantial for many of the portfolios. There are multiple 
cases where value-at-risk is in a superadditive state over half the time.  
 
 
# 
P&L 
corr. 
α 
Sample size 
250 500 1000 
1 0,952 
0,95 33,2 % 14,5 % 28,4 % 
0,99 1,3 % 48,5 % 4,4 % 
2 0,885 
0,95 18,5 % 21,6 % 24,1 % 
0,99 10,2 % 51,4 % 47,5 % 
3 0,354 
0,95 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
0,99 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
4 0,933 
0,95 17,8 % 33,8 % 62,9 % 
0,99 33,5 % 52,5 % 1,5 % 
5 -0,952 
0,95 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
0,99 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
6 0,952 
0,95 15,7 % 19,3 % 0,0 % 
0,99 11,5 % 52,3 % 57,6 % 
7 0,805 
0,95 41,8 % 33,4 % 3,2 % 
0,99 3,7 % 34,9 % 2,9 % 
8 -0,973 
0,95 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
0,99 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 
Table 5.7: Subadditivity backtest with a testing period of 1000 days. The correlation coefficient on the 
historical P&L is also shown for comparison. 
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No general tendency can be traced to explain how either the choice of confidence level or the 
choice of sample size is impacting the amount of superadditivity. That subadditivity violations 
seem to be independent of confidence level is very surprising. Given that it is generally 
thought to be caused by coarseness in the tail-region of historical return distributions, one 
would expect it to be more prevalent at higher confidence levels. The limited amount of tests 
performed could be a likely reason for this. This would mean that there is in fact a 
relationship between the two, but it is dwarfed by the large randomness factor of the tests. 
Figure 5.4 below shows the development of the first subadditivity test over time at 95% and 
Figure 5.5 does so at 99%. Similar graphs for the other tests are shown in Figures B.1-B.14 in 
the appendix, using the same portfolios as in the previous chapter. The graphs sketched with 
sample size 500 often falls somewhere between those using 250 and 1000, respectively. To 
keep the figures reader friendly, those data are not shown. This is not always true, however. 
As seen in Figure 5.5, the 99%-VaR is kept stable after the most volatile periods of financial 
crisis in 2008. While it has stabilized in subadditive state for sample sizes 250 and 1000, for 
500 it has stabilized in a marginally non-subadditive state. This has a major impact on the 
results shown in Table 5.7. 
Tests 3, 5 and 8 are the only ones which have no violations at all. As seen in their respective 
figures in Appendix B, subadditivity is clearly satisfied during the entire period. This is true 
for all tried confidence levels and sample sizes. Interestingly, it is only for these tests the 
correlation between the two portfolios is low. The correlation for Test 5 is negative, and VaR 
is even more subadditive here than for Test 3. That combining two portfolios of with a low 
correlation coefficient reduces risk, and ideally also the VaR number, is widely known and 
was discussed in Chapter 3.1. But from the tests here, a low correlation also seems to increase 
the amount of subadditivity as well, all the way to practically eliminating the problem at 
negative correlation. 
Given the nature of the historical simulation, first of all the rolling window approach, one of 
the properties of this kind of backtesting is that violations of subadditivity tend to cluster 
together. Rather than being single day occurrences, subadditivity often stays violated for quite 
some time. Larger sample size makes the function dependent on data further in the past, while 
new data has relatively less of an impact. Thus, subadditivity clustering becomes more 
prominent with longer samples. In the example in Figure 5.4, for sample size = 1000, value-
at-risk is continuously non-subadditive from September 7
th
 2007 to August 11
th
 2008. After 
September 4
th
 2008, subadditivity is not violated again until the end of the period. 
This kind of backtesting suffers from a limitation compared to the standard backtesting 
technique discussed in Chapter 4.5. For the VaR-number itself, a certain amount of violations 
are expected. In fact, the whole principle of value-at-risk is that it is expected to be violated 
with a certain probability 1-α, and therefore a hypothesis test can be constructed from this to 
check its performance. This is not true for subadditivity testing. Here, violations are not 
expected at all and can potentially induce additional risks in itself. The ideal number of 
violations is therefore zero, but there is no marker over whether this portfolio „succeeds‟ or 
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„fails‟ the subadditivity test. The only indication is that the number should be as low as 
possible. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Subadditivity backtest at α = 95% with a portfolio A: $1000 of A.0 and a portfolio B: 
$1000 of A.1 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Subadditivity backtest at α = 99% with a portfolio A: $1000 of A.0 and a portfolio B: 
$1000 of A.1 
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5.5 Follow-up testing 
The previous chapters discussed portfolios which were supposed to be representative for 
certain types of portfolios. It is also possible to try to create portfolios which should generate 
certain results.  
Since low correlation seems to increase the likelihood of VaR being subadditive, an 
interesting point would be to see how low the correlation coefficient could be reduced, and 
still have some degree of superadditivity. Through the scientifically unsound method of just 
trying out a large amount of different portfolios more or less at random, some instances of 
superadditivity were found where the correlation coefficient was fairly close zero.  
The lowest of these was for quite a simple combination where the first portfolio contained 
$1000 worth of spot prices in Brent crude. The second portfolio was contained a long position 
$1000 one-month Brent futures which was hedged by $1000 short position of three-month 
Dated Brent futures. This calculated to a correlation between the portfolios of 0,039. Figure 
5.5 shows the development of the subadditivity test. As can be seen, the 250 day-period VaR 
at 95% confidence level dips just below zero during the autumn of 2008, incidentally the 
volatile period caused by the financial crash. In this situation, subadditivity is violated 1,0% 
of the total time period. 
Pushing this even more to the extreme, Figure 5.6 shows the backtest of the same portfolios 
but where the position of Dated Brent has been increased to 1009$. Correlation in this case 
has dropped just below zero (at -0,002), while a tiny fraction of superadditivity still remains 
on one single day.  
 
Figure 5.5:  Portfolio A: 1000$ A.0, Portfolio B: 1000$ of A.1 and 1000$ of B.3. Correlation 0,039.  
Violations at  t=250 and α=95% accounts for 1,0%. 
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Figure 5.6:  Portfolio A: 1000$ of A.0, Portfolio B: 1000$ of A.1 and 1000$ of B.3.  
Correlation = -0,002.  Violations at t=250 and α=95% accounts for 0,1% 
 
The methodology is too crude to conclude anything concrete, but it seems like a strange 
coincidence that it proves so difficult to create violations of subadditivity at negative 
correlation. When it is finally accomplished, it is only just slightly and it could be explained 
away with roughness in the modeling. There may be a logical reason for this, that it is in fact 
theoretically impossible to have both at same time.  
 
5.6 Possible solutions 
The method discussed in Chapters 5.1 and 5.2 uses equal weights for the entire data sample. 
While this is the simplest way of simulating historical returns, it assigns importance to the 
data quite unrealistically. For a sample size T=250, the return on all 250 trading days ago is 
given equal importance, whereas the return on the 251
st
 trading day is not taken into account 
at all. 
A possible solution to this problem is to assign descending weights that depend on how far in 
the past the data was recorded. The hybrid approach developed by Boudoukh, Richardson and 
Whitelaw (1999), often referred to as the BRW-model, can assign a historical weighting 
scheme according to a set decay factor. If λ is the decay factor, then the weight on day t can 
be calculated as: 
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   (   ) 
The choice of decay factor can be a challenge, and has a significant impact on the VaR-
estimate. It should be a number between 0 and 1, and the most common value decay factor is 
no doubt λ = 0,97, which is the one used by the RiskMetrics standard. As t increases the 
weight will then approach 0, and the sum of the weights will approach 1. A large enough 
sample size is needed for the sum to be sufficiently close to 1. For λ = 0,97,  a sample period 
of one year gives the weight sum of 0,9995 which ought to suffice. A higher decay factor will 
require a significantly longer history of data for this to be fulfilled, as can be noted from Table 
5.8. A decay factor equal to 1 translates to no decay at all, and the standard historical is thus a 
special case of the BRW-model. 
 
Sum λ =0,97 0,98 0,99 0,995 
0,90 76 114 230 460 
0,95 99 149 299 598 
0,99 152 228 459 919 
0,995 174 264 528 1057 
0,999 227 342 688 1378 
Table 5.8: Sample sizes needed in order to achieve certain weight sums at various decay factors 
Using longer historical periods also creates a problem in itself which is may be even more 
difficult to solve. The market regime may undergo changes during the historical period. 
Commodity future prices often moves in bubbles and bursts, undergo seasonal fluctuations 
and rapidly switching between contango and backwardation. Alexander (2008) suggests that 
portfolio returns could be artificially adjusted so that the volatility is approximately constant 
over the entire period. Volatility clustering gets removed from historical returns and imposed 
a constant volatility on the series, one that is equal to the conditional volatility of the series at 
the time VaR is estimated. Two methods are suggested in order to implement this: 
1. Reconstruction of portfolio returns  
2. Adjustment of individual risk factors 
Alternative 1 is simpler because it only requires one volatility adjustment at the top level. The 
second alternative would fundamentally be more robust, but with a cost of increased 
complexity in the calculations. 
Historical simulations, with adjustment using parametric hybrid methods such as these, will 
make the distribution in the tail region smoother. As was shown by Daníelsson (2010), a 
substantial reduction in subadditivity violations should be expected.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
The non-subadditivity discussed by Artzner et al. (1999) is not only a logical issue that only 
arises in certain extreme cases, but is actually discovered to be quite common. This is at least 
true for simple positions of oil futures prices using unweighted historical simulation.  
Contrary to what one would expect, the degree of subadditivity violations seems to be 
independent of both the choice of sample size and confidence level. It has, on the other hand, 
a distinct relationship with the correlation between the portfolio returns. A negative 
correlation causes a superadditive VaR to be virtually impossible, and even a low positive 
number makes it extremely unlikely. Thus, hedging a long position with a highly correlated 
short position is an effective way not only in reducing the actual risk, but also in eliminating 
superadditivity. 
The degree of subadditivity in historical VaR simulation often displays clustering. Long 
periods of subadditivity can be offset by long periods of superadditivity. Since the historical 
VaR has a tendency to stabilize at a certain value after volatile periods, whether this happens 
in a subadditive or non-subadditive state can have a major impact on the quality of the risk 
measure. For two highly correlated portfolios, it is not unlikely that the combined VaR could 
be subadditive less than half the time. No instances were found where subadditivity was 
constantly violated all the time. 
Increased complexity in the structure of the portfolios makes subadditivity violations occur 
less often.  Possibly, this is only due to the low probability of creating two highly correlated 
complex portfolios, but there may also be some benefit in complexity in itself. This paper has 
mainly investigated quite simple positions, but a similar study by Dahl (2011) concludes that 
when the number of positions is larger than 10, superadditivity becomes increasingly unlikely 
even at high correlation.  
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8 Appendices 
Appendix A – Single-day tests 
 
Figure A.1: Test 2 - Portfolio A: $1000 of D.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 of D.2. 
 
 
Figure A.2: Test 3 - Portfolio A: $1000 of B.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 of E.2 
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Figure A.3: Test 4 - Portfolio A: $1000 each of D.0 + D.3 + E.2.  Portfolio B: $1000 each of C.0 + 
D.2 + E.2. 
 
 
Figure A.4: Test 5 - Portfolio A: $1000 long position of A.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 short position of A.1 
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Figure A.5: Test 6 - Portfolio A: $1000 short position of A.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 short position of A.1 
 
 
Figure A.6: Test 7: Portfolios as described in Table 5.5 
  
51 
 
 
Figure A.7: Test 8 - Portfolios as described in Table 5.5 
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Appendix B - Backtests 
 
Figure B.1: Test 2 - Portfolio A: $1000 of D.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 of D.2.   
 
 
Figure B.2: Test 2 - Portfolio A: $1000 of D.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 of D.2. 
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Figure B.3: Test 3 - Portfolio A: $1000 of B.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 of E.1 
 
.
 
Figure B.4: Test 3 - Portfolio A: $1000 of B.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 of E.1 
54 
 
 
 
Figure B.5: Test 4 - Portfolio A: $1000 each of D.0 + D.3 + E.2.  Portfolio B: $1000 each of C.0 + 
D.2 + E.2.  
 
Figure B.6: Test 4 - Portfolio A: $1000 each of D.0 + D.3 + E.2.  Portfolio B: $1000 each of C.0 + 
D.2 + E.2. 
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Figure B.7: Test 5 - Portfolio A: $1000 long position of A.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 short position of A.1. 
 
Figure B.8: Test 5 - Portfolio A: $1000 long position of A.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 short position of A.1. 
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Figure B.9: Test 6 - Portfolio A: $1000 short position of A.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 short position of 
A.1. 
 
Figure B.10: Test 6 - Portfolio A: $1000 short position of A.0.  Portfolio B: $1000 short position of 
A.1. 
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Figure B.11: Test 7 - Portfolios as described in Table 5.5 
 
 
Figure B.12:  Test 7 - Portfolios as described in Table 5.5 
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Figure B.13: Test 8 - Portfolios as described in Table 5.5  
 
Figure B.14: Test 8 - Portfolios as described in Table 5.5 
